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Abstract
This paper uses labor market evidence to quantify the importance of quality-
adjusted schooling differences in accounting for cross-country income differences. I
model labor markets that are consistent with cross-country data on schooling attain-
ment, education quality, and the average returns to schooling of a country’s emigrants
and its non-migrants. The model suggests that the Mincerian returns to schooling
of immigrants to the United States measure the education qualities of their source
countries. Measured this way, quality differences across countries are large, and the
calibrated model shows that schooling accounts for a factor of 5 of the income differ-
ence between the U.S. and the poorest countries. The evidence suggests that immi-
grants to the U.S. are positively selected members of their source country, and that
immigrants from developing countries are more selected than those from developed
countries. Then the low education quality measured in the sample actually overesti-
mates the education quality of the average non-migrant, particularly for developing
countries. Two methods of controlling for selection among immigrants thus predict a
moderately larger role for schooling, between a factor of 6.5 and 7.9.
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1 Introduction
Recent work by Bils and Klenow (2000) has led to a widely adopted methodology for
quantifying the income importance of cross-country schooling differences. The methodology
values each year of schooling by the micro-level (Mincerian) returns to schooling for that
year, so that education’s contribution to income differences between countries i and j with
average years of schooling Si and Sj is given by:
Yi
Yj
= exp
 Si∑
k=1
M(k)−
Sj∑
k=1
M(k)

The Mincerian returns schedule M(k) is taken to be the same across countries, so the value
of a given (i.e., first) year of schooling is the same across all countries. This assumption
is contrary to evidence from internationally standardized achievement tests that there are
large education quality differences across countries, but is justified by the fact that Min-
cerian returns are no higher in developed than developing countries.1 This paper shows
that in an equilibrium model of labor markets, Mincerian returns convey no information
about education quality, since returns are an equilibrium price determined by supply and
demand. Instead, a country’s average schooling attainment and the returns to schooling
of that country’s emigrants are better sources of information about the size and income
importance of education quality differences.
The baseline model features a set of ex-ante identical workers with a single exogenous
education quality in each country. Workers choose how long to go to school, which de-
termines the supply of human capital. There is a continuum of heterogeneous industries
that vary in the skill-intensity of their production processes. The firms offer different wage
schedules and hire workers with different skill levels, determining the demand for schooling.
In equilibrium, education quality affects the length of time workers spend in school and their
returns to schooling if they emigrate, but not the returns to schooling of non-migrants.
In the standard analysis, higher education quality raises the human capital difference
between workers with different years of schooling, implying larger Mincerian returns. In
this model, there are two offsetting effects. First, higher returns induce workers to go to
school longer. Given diminishing marginal returns to schooling, this supply response acts
1Bils and Klenow (2000) use a separate method to account for education quality, as discussed below.
Since Hall and Jones (1999), it has been common in the literature to use only the Mincerian term shown
here, without the education quality corrections.
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to reduce Mincerian returns. Second, countries with higher education quality are more
abundant in human capital. The model generates a decrease in the relative prices and
wages of skill-intensive industries, so that a demand effect also acts to reduce Mincerian
returns. In equilibrium, the total effect of these two changes is that the entire schedule of
returns to schooling is constant across countries.
I collect the labor market data necessary to test the model’s predictions and show
that they are qualitatively consistent with the model. In countries with higher education
quality as measured by internationally standardized achivement tests, workers go to school
longer and earn higher returns if they emigrate, but they earn no higher returns if they
do not migrate. I then construct an education quality measure based on the returns to
schooling of workers who completed their education abroad and subsequently immigrated
to the United States. This process is an extension of the methodology used in Card and
Krueger (1992) to measure cross-state education quality. The resulting series covers a large
sample of countries (130), has an economically significant scale (human capital generated
per year of schooling), and is highly correlated with other measures of education quality
(internationally standardized achievement tests). I use the education quality series as an
input to a calibrated model that quantitatively fits labor market data. The model predicts
that quality-adjusted schooling accounts for a factor 5 of the income difference between
the United States and the poorest country. This number is larger than the usual 2-3
predicted in the literature that uses the Bils and Klenow technique but makes no quality
adjustment; see for instance Hall and Jones (1999). It is also larger than the baseline figure
from Hendricks (2002), another paper that uses immigrants from many countries in the
U.S. to make inferences about cross-country human capital differences. However, one of his
extensions is to consider a model with a CES aggregator over skilled and unskilled labor,
which produces a relative demand effect similar to that caused by heterogeneity in industry
skill intensity in this paper. In his extension he finds that human capital accounts for about
a factor of 5 of the income difference across countries, comparable to this paper’s results.
The key step in the analysis uses the returns to schooling of immigrants as a measure
of their source country education quality. A well-known criticism of the Card and Krueger
methodology by Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996) is that selection of immigrants
may bias these returns, and hence the overall analysis. Evidence suggests that immigrants
are positively selected on their education: for all but one country, immigrants are more
educated than non-migrants. The average education gap is 6 years, suggesting a selection
problem. Immigrants from lower-income countries are more selected by this measure; the
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most selected immigrants are from Sierra Leone, with 11.6 more years of schooling than
non-migrants. Intuitively, then, accounting for selection should raise the predicted role for
schooling. I consider two ways to address the selection problem.
First, I collapse the role of technological heterogeneity in the baseline model. Without
heterogeneity, aggregate variables can be approximated with simple closed-form solutions
similar to those of Bils and Klenow. The impact of education quality can be accounted
for by introducing an additional parameter into the Bils and Klenow methodology, which
makes it easy to implement. This parameter is estimated by regressing a country’s average
schooling attainment on the returns to schooling of its emigrants. If the returns are noisy
or biased, an instrumental variable is called for; I instrument using internationally stan-
dardized achievement test scores. Implementing this procedure yields the estimate that a
year of schooling in the highest education-quality countries is worth 3.4 years of schooling
in the lowest education-quality country. Quality-adjusted schooling is predicted to account
for a factor 6.5 of the income difference between the richest and poorest country.
Second, I extend the model to incorporate explicit ex-ante heterogeneity in education
quality across workers. Calibrating this version of the model includes simulating the ed-
ucation quality type of each country’s emigrants. The calibration suggests that immi-
grants from developing countries are much more selected than immigrants from developed
countries. The structural correction for immigrant selection predicts that quality-adjusted
schooling accounts for a factor of 7.9 of the income difference between the richest and
poorest country, in line with the reduced-form correction.
The approach taken here contrasts with most of the previous work on education quality.
Since data on education quality is generally scarce, most research has been model-driven.
The key attribute of these models is an education quality production function, which deter-
mines what factors combine with student time to produce human capital. Bils and Klenow
(2000) use a formulation where human capital of the previous generation augments cur-
rent schooling, an analogue to allowing for teacher quality. Most research has focused on
the role of education expenditures, with the recent work of Manuelli and Seshadri (2005),
Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2007), Ripoll and Cordoba (2007), and You (2008)
adopting the Ben-Porath (1967) human capital production function. Tamura (2001) allows
class sizes and the human capital of teachers relative to parents to affect education quality,
representing a mixture of teacher quality and expenditure channels.
I view this literature and my paper as strong complements. I produce a measure of
education quality and its role in accounting for income differences that is independent of
4
a specified education quality production function. Independence is a virtue since the edu-
cation literature has produced a broad range of estimates for education quality production
functions; see Hanushek (1995) and Hanushek (2002) for an overview. In particular, while
expenditure on education is often thought to be an important way to improve quality, there
is little empirical guidance on the size of the channel. The calibrated size of this channel
is key to the estimates of the importance of quality-adjusted education. Hence, this paper
is useful as evidence on education quality that does not rely on this channel. On the other
hand, the primary deficiency of not specifying a production function is that this paper can
provide no policy prescriptions since it is agnostic about the sources of what are measured
to be large quality differences. Their work provides insight on this subject.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model without worker het-
erogeneity and derives the main effects of education quality. Section 3 collects the data
and shows that they support the predictions of the model. Section 4 calibrates the model
and measures the implied importance of quality-adjusted schooling. Section 5 introduces a
reduced-form correction for immigrant selection. Section 6 modifies the model to allow for
worker heterogeneity. Section 7 re-calibrates the model to account for worker heterogeneity.
Section 8 concludes.
2 A Model with Ex-Ante Identical Workers
The baseline model features a continuum of ex-ante identical workers and heterogeneous
intermediate goods firms. The main predictions of the model come from the labor market
interactions between these two groups in the face of exogenous cross-country differences
in education quality. The labor market features of interest are the schooling choices of
workers, the returns to schooling offered in each country, and the returns to schooling of
cross-country migrants.
2.1 Population Dynamics
The world consists of J closed economies, with individual economies indexed by subscript j.
Each economy has a continuum of measure 1 of ex-ante identical infinitely-lived dynasties,
with a representative dynasty denoted by d. A dynasty is a sequence of altruistically linked
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workers who each live for Tj periods.
2 As soon as a worker dies he is replaced by a young
worker who inherits his assets but not his human capital. The date of death across dynasties
is staggered so that exactly T−1j workers die in each year.
2.2 Dynasties
Each dynasty has the same power felicity function with intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution σ. Preferences over sequences of consumption cj(d, t) are given by:
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
cj(d, t)
1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σ dt
where ρ is the rate of time discounting.
At time t, the dynasty has two sources of income. If the worker has finished school, he
earns labor income as a function of his schooling attainment Wj(Sj(d, t), t); the dynasty
also earns returns on asset holdings Rj(t)aj(d, t). The dynasty spends this income on
consumption cj(d, t) and on changes in its net asset holdings a˙j(d, t). Then its period
budget constraint is given by:
cj(d, t) + a˙j(d, t) = Wj(Sj(d, t), t) +Rj(t)aj(d, t) (1)
The dynasty is subject to a borrowing constraint:
lim
t→∞
a(d, t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(r(θ))dθ
)
≥ 0
Its preferences can be summarized by the standard Euler equation:
c˙j(d, t)
cj(d, t)
= σ(Rj(t)− ρ) (2)
2Altruistically linked in the standard sense of Barro (1974). The only demographic factor accounted
for here is average life expectancy, but Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) also find large effects when they
account for differences in the age distribution of the population. I also ignore issues related to stochastic
mortality; see Tamura (2006), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000), or Soares (2005) for a model where
this uncertainty may be important.
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2.3 Labor-Schooling Decision
The decision of how to allocate time between work and school is based on the models of
Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964). Workers are endowed with one unit of time each period.
For simplicity, I abstract from tuition costs of schooling or the possibility that workers may
prefer time spent in schooling to time spent in the labor force. Workers take the wage as a
function of schooling Wj(S, t) as given. They allocate their time endowment to maximize
lifetime income. As is standard, workers separate their lives into two periods: they go to
school full-time from the beginning of their life until age S, after which they work full-time.
The problem of a worker born at time τ is to choose Sj(d, t) to maximize lifetime income:
max
Sj(d,t)
∫ τ+Tj
τ+Sj(d,t)
e−
R t
τ Rj(θ)dθWj(Sj(d, t), t)dt
The worker’s income maximization problem has first order condition:∫ τ+Tj
τ+Sj(d,t)
e−
R t
τ R(θ)dθ
∂Wj(Sj(d, t), t)
∂Sj(d, t)
dt = e−
R τ+Sj(d,t)
τ R(θ)dθW (Sj(d, t), Sj(d, t) + τ) (3)
Workers go to school until the present discounted value of the future wage gains from an
additional unit of schooling equals the wage foregone to obtain that unit of schooling.
2.4 Human Capital Production Function
While workers choose schooling solely to maximize income, firms care about the productive
value of schooling. The link between schooling and its productive value is provided by the
human capital production function. A worker with Sj(d, t) years of schooling has human
capital:
Hj(d, t) = exp
[
(Sj(d, t)Qj)
η
η
]
(4)
Qj is the exogenous quality of education in country j. The focus here is on measuring edu-
cation quality, rather than on modeling the allocation of resources or education institutions
that imply Qj. Education quality is typically determined through a political process in-
volving teachers, parents, voters, and the government, so it is plausible to treat the variable
as exogenous to the individual students making decisions on how long to attend school.
This function is similar to the one used in Bils and Klenow (2000) and Klenow and
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Rodriguez-Clare (1997), particularly in allowing for diminishing returns to schooling. The
primary difference is that education quality enters exponentially, rather than multiplica-
tively as in their formulations. Entering education quality in this way is critical to matching
the robust fact that education quality has an effect on workers’ decisions about how long to
remain in school. Section 3 documents that this holds across countries, but significant mi-
croeconomic evidence also exists; see for instance Case and Deaton (1999), Hanushek, Lavy,
and Hitomi (2006), or Hanushek and Woessmann (2007). The assumption that 0 < η < 1
is also necessary to obtain this result, so it is maintained throughout.
2.5 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each country has a continuum of industries distributed uniformly on [γ
¯
, γ¯]. Each industry
has its own technology to produce a unique intermediate good. The industries differ in
the skill intensity of their technologies. Output in industry γ is given by the production
function:
Yj(γ, t) = Kj(γ, t)
α (Aj(t)Hj(γ, t)
γLj(γ, t))
1−α (5)
where Aj(t) is the labor-augmenting efficiency level general to the entire country, Kj(γ, t)
and Lj(γ, t) are the capital and labor choices specific to the industry, and Hj(γ, t) is the
human capital per worker in the industry. Efficiency grows exogenously at rate g. Given
the human capital accumulation function in equation (4), higher γ industries are more
skill-intensive. The standard analysis using human capital assumes γ = 1 (Bils and Klenow
2000). Considering heterogeneity changes the interpretation of cross-sectional information
such as Mincerian returns, but does not affect the interpretation of aggregate outcomes;
see Section 5.
There is a large set of potential entrants, so that no profits are earned and the equilibrium
number of firms in each industry is indeterminate. Then industry γ takes the time t real
price of its output Pj(γ, t), the rental price of capital Rj(t) + δ, and the schedule of wages
Wj(S, t) as given. It chooses the capital stock, labor hours, and level of schooling per worker
to maximize profits each period. Substituting in for human capital, the industry’s problem
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is:
max
Kj(γ,t),Lj(γ,t),Sj(γ,t)
Pj(γ, t)Kj(γ, t)
α
{
Aj(t) exp
[
γ
η
(Sj(γ, t)Qj)
η
]
Lj(γ, t)
}1−α
−(Rj(t) + δ)Kj(γ, t)−Wj(Sj(γ, t), t)Lj(γ, t)
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are:
αPj(γ, t)
Yj(γ, t)
Kj(γ, t)
= Rj(t) + δ (6)
(1− α)Pj(γ, t)Yj(γ, t)
Lj(γ, t)
= Wj(Sj(γ, t), t) (7)
(1− α)γPj(γ, t)Sj(γ, t)η−1Qηj
Yj(γ, t)
Lj(γ, t)
=
∂Wj(Sj(γ, t), t)
∂Sj(γ, t)
(8)
Combining (7) and (8) yields the equation that relates the optimal schooling level to
the log wage returns to schooling:
∂ log(W (Sj(γ, t), t))
∂Sj(γ, t)
= γSj(γ, t)
η−1Qηj (9)
2.6 Balanced Growth Path
A final goods producer uses a CES production function with elasticity of substitution ψ to
aggregate the intermediate goods into a final good suitable for consumption or investment.
Since the focus here is on the interaction between intermediate producers and workers, the
firm’s problem is described in Appendix A. I also define an equilibrium and the balanced
growth path there. For the rest of the paper I confine my attention to the balanced growth
path. Most of the equations simplify.
The real interest rate is constant over time and across countries at R = g
σ
+ ρ, so
the capital-output ratio K/Y will also be constant across countries. This has the effect
of isolating the impact of schooling in the usual accounting sense. The optimal schooling
decision of workers is:
R− g
1− exp[−(R− g)(Tj − Sj(d))] =
∂ log(Wj(Sj(d)))
∂Sj(d)
= Mj
The local change in log wages with respect to schooling in country j is the Mincerian returns
to schooling Mj. There exists a large labor literature estimating regressions of log-wages
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on schooling and other factors that I will be able to exploit for information. For ease of
exposition, I adopt the additional assumptions that σ = 1, i.e. that the felicity function is
log, and that the equilibrium Tj − Sj is large. The second assumption is standard in the
labor literature, but somewhat unusual here where schooling is endogenous. I use it only
to present simplified results familiar from that literature; I drop both assumptions when I
calibrate the model. Under these assumptions, the Mincerian returns are given by:
Mj = R− g = ρ (10)
The model predicts Mincerian returns are constant and unrelated to education quality.3
Equation (10) is from Becker (1964): workers go to school until the marginal log-wage
returns to schooling equal their internal discount rate. As in Mincer (1958), this condition
does not define the optimal schooling decision of a worker. Rather, since all workers are
ex-ante identical, it defines the indifference curve of the representative worker: a worker
is willing to get any number of years of schooling, as long as he receives an appropriately
higher wage upon graduation.
The behavior of the intermediate industries also simplifies along the balanced growth
path. Rearranging their first-order conditions yields the zero-profit log wage schedule offered
in industry γ:
log(Wj(S, t; γ)) = A(0) + gt+ log
[
(1− α)αα/(1−α)Pj(γ)1/(1−α)
(R + δ)α/(1−α)
]
+
γ
η
(SQj)
η (11)
Since industries are competitive, each firm in the industry posts this wage schedule. The
intercept of the wage depends on the industry output price Pj(γ), and the slope depends on
industry skill-intensity γ and education qualityQj. In equilibrium all varieties are produced,
so workers must be willing to work in any industry. Industry prices Pj(γ) adjust to satisfy
worker indifference. Heterogeneity in skill intensity across industries leads to heterogeneity
in schooling outcomes. The equilibrium level of schooling is given by the point of tangency
3A more general formulation would allow tuition costs, borrowing constraints, and other factors to
affect schooling decisions. These other factors would show up on the right hand side of equation (10).
The key point would remain in such a formulation, however: in a model with an endogenous schooling
choice, Mincerian returns reflect the opportunity cost of a year of schooling, including time but possibly
also tuition, wedges induced by borrowing constraints, and so on.
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between workers’ indifference curve and the industries’ zero-profit wage schedule:
Sj(γ) =
[
γQηj
ρ
]1/(1−η)
(12)
Given 0 < η < 1, higher education quality leads to higher average schooling attainment.
Schooling attainment is a useful source of information about education quality differences.
The Mincerian returns to schooling are the same within and across all countries even if
there are large education quality differences. There are two mechanisms that are important
for this result. First, there are diminishing marginal returns to schooling. Higher education
quality raises the returns on a given year of schooling, but the higher returns induce workers
to go to school longer, pushing down marginal returns. This mechanism explains why
average returns are similar across countries despite education quality differences. The
second mechanism is that the returns to schooling are affected by the demand for schooling.
Consider two workers in a given country, of which one has completed primary schooling
and one secondary. As education quality (of secondary school) rises, the human capital
difference between the workers also rises, suggesting a larger wage differential. However,
the heterogeneous technologies allow for an offsetting demand effect. More educated workers
are employed in different industries, and the model predicts a decline in the price of the
goods they produce, which acts to lower their relative wages. This mechanism explains
why the cross-sectional distribution of wages by schooling levels is similar across countries
despite education quality differences.
Aggregate Mincerian returns confound information about quality of education and
scarcity of human capital. Using immigrants to the United States is a natural way to
hold the scarcity of human capital fixed (at the United States level) and measure the qual-
ity of education of other countries. Suppose that a worker immigrates from another country
i with schooling attainment Sij, and that country i has education quality Qi. As long as
Qi 6= Qj, this worker will earn a different wage than a native worker with the same schooling
attainment because they will have different human capital levels. The slope of his log-wage
schedule is given by:
M ij =
Qi
Qj
Mj (13)
The returns to foreign schooling are directly proportional to the relative education quality
of the foreign schooling. Immigrants from countries with education quality half of the
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domestic level accumulate half as much human capital per year of schooling and earn half
the rate of return per year of schooling.
The model makes three predictions for how education quality interacts with labor market
outcomes: it positively affects schooling attainment and the returns to schooling of the
country’s emigrants, but has no effect on the domestic returns to schooling. It also says
that the returns to schooling of immigrants are a measure of their source country’s education
quality. In the next section I construct the suggested education quality measure and test
the three predictions against labor market observations.
3 Cross-Country Data on Schooling
3.1 Four Sources of Data
In this section I show that the predicted relationships hold in the data, using internationally
standardized achievement test scores as a measure of education quality. I also use the
internationally standardized achievement test scores as a check on the validity of the next
step, which is using the returns to schooling of immigrants as a measure of education quality.
Data on schooling attainment is average years of schooling in the over-25 population of
different countries in 1999, taken from the Barro-Lee data set (Barro and Lee 1996, Barro
and Lee 2001). Scores on internationally standardized achievement tests are taken from
Hanushek and Kimko (2000). They construct a test score index for a broad cross-section
of countries by aggregating a series of different testing programs running from 1966-1991.4
Returns to schooling are commonly measured using Mincerian returns gathered from a
regression of log-wages on schooling and a series of controls. I use a set of estimates
covering many countries gathered by Banerjee and Duflo (2005); their work is an update
on Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
The fourth source of data is the returns to schooling of immigrants to the United States.
Estimation follows Card and Krueger (1992), who use the returns to schooling of cross-state
migrants to identify the quality of education of the migrants’ source state. Their idea was
previously extended to cross-country migrants by Bratsberg and Terrell (2002); I repeat
their exercise with a few changes using 2000 U.S. Census data. U.S. Census data is ideal
4I also consider test scores from the OECD PISA exam in 2000/2003 and the U.S. Department of
Education TIMSS Exam in 1995/1999/2003. Results for both series are qualitatively similar throughout
and are available upon request.
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because it covers a large sample of immigrants from many different countries and contains
information on wages, schooling attainment, and language ability, as well as variables that
make it possible to impute which immigrants likely completed their schooling abroad. The
regression equation is:
log(W i,kUS) = b
i +M iUSS
i,k
US + βX
i,k
US + ε
i,k
US (14)
where W i,kUS is the wage of immigrant k from country i in the United States. b
i is a country-
of-origin fixed effect, M iUS is the returns to country i schooling in the United States, and
X i,kUS is a vector of control variables. Including country of origin fixed effects gives the
estimates a differences-in-differences interpretation: rather than comparing Mexicans with
12 years of education to Americans as in Hendricks (2002), I compare the marginal wage
gain associated with an additional year of Mexican schooling with the marginal wage gain
associated with an additional year of American schooling. The fixed effect is presumed to
help control for at least some forms of immigrant selection.
I implement this equation using the 5% sample of the 2000 Census Public Use Micro
Survey, made available through the IPUMS system (Ruggles, Sobek, Alexander, Fitch,
Goeken, Hall, King, and Ronnander 2004). Immigrants are identified by country of birth.5
The Census lists separately each of 130 statistical entities with at least 10,000 immigrants
counted in the United States. Some of these statistical entities are nonstandard: for in-
stance, there are response categories for Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia,
since immigrants came both before and after the split. I preserve every statistical entity
which is separately identified, and refer to them as countries as a shorthand.6
The Census includes a measure of schooling attainment which I recode as years of
schooling in the usual manner. The Census does not provide direct information on where
the schooling was obtained. Instead, I use information on age, year of immigration, and
schooling attainment to impute which immigrants likely completed their schooling before
immigrating. It is important to exclude from the sample immigrants who may have received
5A potential bias could arise if immigrants are born in one country but receive their schooling in
another. Fortunately, the Census asks all persons where they lived 5 years ago. For the subset of workers
who immigrated within the last 5 years, 89% report living in their country of birth 5 years ago. Examining
the data country-by-country, there is little evidence that the probability varies by income or other variables
of interest.
6There are two exceptions to this rule: I exclude the USSR, Russia, and North Korea because the data
do not allow me to differentiate these groups to the extent necessary. I also merge the United Kingdom
into a single observation.
13
some or all of their education within the United States to have an unbiased estimate of
source-country education quality. The sample used includes all workers who immigrated to
the United States at least six years after their expected date of completing their reported
education. For instance, a high school graduate (12 years of schooling) would need to be
at least 24 (start school at 6, go to school 12 years, add 6) to be included in the sample.
The extra six years are allowed to help minimize the noise coming from workers who repeat
grades or delay school, for instance to fulfill mandatory armed forces obligations.
The sample includes respondents aged 19-64 who were employed but not self-employed
in the previous year. The wage is calculated as previous year’s average weekly wage. The
vector of controls includes age and its square, gender, a dummy for residence in metropolitan
area, a set of dummies for self-assessed English language proficiency on a five-option scale,
dummies for Census region of residence, a disability dummy, and a full set of year of
immigration dummies.
The final sample includes 4.1 million Americans and 220,000 immigrants from 130 dif-
ferent source countries. Appendix B provides regression results, including number of ob-
servations and standard errors. The measured U.S. returns are 10.2%. Results from other
countries vary widely. The highest returns are observed for immigrants from Tanzania,
Sweden, and Belgium, at 14-15%. A few countries have negative returns, although none of
these coefficients is statistically significant. Two useful benchmarks on the low end of the
scale are Laos and Mexico, with 0.8% and 0.9% returns estimated with a large sample of
immigrants.
3.2 Testing the Model
I can now test the model’s three predictions, using internationally standardized achievement
test scores as a measure of education quality. The first prediction is that average schooling
attainment and education quality are positively correlated across countries. Figure 1 plots
average years schooling against test scores. The relationship is positive and economically
significant.
The second and third predictions are that the returns to schooling are uncorrelated
with school quality at home, but are positively correlated with school quality for emigrants.
Figure 2 plots both types of returns. Returns observed in the same country are actually
slightly negatively correlated with education quality.
The data support both of the model’s predictions about returns to schooling. It is worth
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(b) U.S. Immigrant Returns
Figure 2: Hanushek-Kimko Quality and Returns to Schooling
illustrating the facts about returns with a specific country-pair example. Data from test
scores indicate that Swedish students have access to much higher education quality than do
Mexican students. On the 2003 PISA exam mathematics section, a Swedish student would
have had to score 1.18 standard deviations below average to have the average score of a
Mexican student. Despite this, the Mincerian returns to schooling are actually higher in
Mexico. The model explains this fact by (more than) offsetting supply and demand effects.
High returns have induced Swedish workers to go to school longer (the average Swede has
11.2 years of schooling, against 6.4 for the average Mexican). Additionally, the abundance
of human capital in Sweden has driven down the returns to human capital accumulation.
Among immigrants to the United States, Swedish immigrants earn much higher returns
on their schooling than do Mexican immigrants: since the aggregate scarcity of human
capital in the United States is fixed, there can be no offsetting demand effect, and the lower
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education quality of Mexican schooling is observed. A standard single-technology model
cannot replicate both of these effects, since it requires that Mincerian returns be the same
regardless of where they are observed.
Since the model makes qualitative predictions supported by the data, I now match the
data quantitatively. In particular, I use the immigrant test scores as a measure of education
quality Qj for the large number of countries available. Another way to view Figure 2b is as
an outside check on the validity of this step: education quality measured through returns to
schooling of immigrants is highly correlated with quality measured through internationally
standardized achievement test scores. I then calibrate the model to fit facts about schooling
levels and Mincerian returns, and back out the implied importance of quality-adjusted
schooling in accounting for cross-country income differences.
4 Calibration of the Model
4.1 Fixing Model Parameters
Calibrating the model requires a set of J countries with the necessary inputs to the model:
({Qj, Tj, Aj}Jj=1). Values of Qj are taken from returns to immigrant schooling; see Table 8.
Tj, the potential working life span in country j, is taken to start at age 5 and continue until
the average worker dies or retires. Hence, I set Tj equal to the country’s age 5 life expectancy
(worker expects to die before retirement at 65) or 60 (retirement at 65), whichever is
smaller.7 Aj is set equal to one, which is innocuous in this model since efficiency does not
affect schooling decisions or returns to schooling. Then the income differences predicted
by the model come solely from differences in education and life expectancy. I compare the
performance of the calibrated model against the actual data values Sj and Mj, which are
taken from the data sources listed in Section 3. Finally, I compare the model’s income
predictions to the data values for Yj, measured as PPP income per capita from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2006).
Relatively few countries have all 6 data points. Rather than discard a large fraction of
the sample, I aggregate over countries. I take the 117 countries that have data for both Yj
and Qj and form them into five quintiles by income per capita. For each quintile, the values
7Age 5 life expectancy is estimated using data on life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, and
under 5 mortality rate, taken from the 2005 Human Development Report (United Nations Development
Programme 2005). I assume that infants who die before age 1 live 0.25 years on average, and that those
who die between ages 1 and 5 live 3 years on average.
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Table 1: Representative Quintiles
Quintile
Observation 1 2 3 4 5 U.S.
M jUS 4.14% 4.02% 4.39% 5.73% 9.70% 10.2%
Mj 8.72% 10.0% 11.8% 8.76% 8.06% 10.0%
Life Exp. 61.4 72.5 72.8 74.4 79.5 77.9
PPP GDP p.c. 1,545 4,004 6,510 13,356 28,060 36,465
Schooling 2.80 5.09 5.89 7.58 9.46 12.2
M jUS and Mj are the log-wage returns to schooling of emigrants to the U.S.
and non-migrants. Life expectancy is age 5 life expectancy calculated as
explained in the text; the value used for Tj is different, as reported.
Schooling is average years schooling from Barro-Lee.
(Qj, Tj, Sj,Mj, Yj) are the average values for the quintile, ignoring missing observations.
Table 1 gives the resulting values for the five quintiles, as well as the United States for
reference.
The model also requires ten parameters to be fully specified. Using immigrant returns
identifies education quality relative to the U.S. level, so I need to calibrate one normalization
Q¯; then each country’s education quality is Qj = M
j
USQ¯. The other nine parameters are
η, γ
¯
, γ¯, α, ρ, g, δ, σ, and ψ. Values for some of these parameters are based on outside evidence
or convenient benchmarks. α = 0.33, σ = 0.5, and δ = 0.06 are standard values (Cooley
and Prescott 1995). I set g = 1.75% to match the average long-term growth rate of real
GDP/capita for a large sample of countries.8 The distribution [γ
¯
, γ¯] is centered on γ = 1
to make my work more comparable with the existing literature.
Then five parameters need to be calibrated in the model: ρ, η, γ¯, Q¯, and ψ. I calibrate
the model using a set of moments related to each parameter’s role in the model. ρ determines
the Mincerian returns, so the first moment is the world average Mincerian returns of 9.1%.
The model predicts little variation across countries, so trying to match each country’s
returns individually yields no additional benefit.
From equation (12), [γ
¯
, γ¯] determines within-country schooling variation between the
most and least skill-intensive industries. The 2000 U.S. Census organizes workers into 475
occupation codes. The average years of schooling by occupation for employed natives aged
8Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), p.3.
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19 to 64 ranges from 10.93 years of schooling for dishwashers to 19.87 years for optometrists.
I compare the model and the data on the basis of the ratio of these values, so the second
moment is SUS(γ¯)
SUS(γ
¯
)
= 19.87
10.93
= 1.82.
Q¯ determines the average world schooling level and η determines the cross-country
variation in schooling that arises from observed education quality differences. I use the
schooling levels of the five quintiles as the corresponding moments for these parameters.
The elasticity of substitution across varieties ψ is difficult to pin down directly because
varieties are defined differently here than is standard in the trade literature. However,
elasticity across varieties also implicitly determines the elasticity of substitution across
workers with different education levels. Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate that the elasticity
of substitution between high school and college educated workers in the United States is
1.4. I use this moment to calibrate ψ.
Table 2: Baseline Model Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Role Value
Calibrated to Outside Evidence
α Capital Share 0.33
δ Capital Depreciation Rate 0.06
σ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 0.5
g GDP p.c. Growth Rate 1.75%
Calibrated to Fit Data
ρ Time Discount Rate 0.073
η εH,S 0.54
Q¯ Quality Level 0.92
γ
¯
Least Skill-Intensive Technology 0.86
γ¯ Most Skill-Intensive Technology 1.14
ψ Substitution Across Varieties 0.18
The model has five free parameters (ρ, η,γ¯, Q¯, and ψ) to match eight moments (average
Mincerian returns, within-U.S. schooling variation, schooling levels for five quintiles, and
elasticity of substitution between U.S. high school and college graduates). Since the model
is overidentified, I minimize a loss function over the sum of squared percentage deviations.
Table 2 presents the full set of baseline calibrated parameters. The rate of time preference
here is higher than the typical ρ = 0.05. The elasticity of schooling across countries is
slightly larger than the η = 0.4 used in Bils and Klenow (2000), but the identification is
very different. The variation in skill intensity across industries is modest. Goods of different
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skill intensities are very poor substitutes; a value of 2-5 is common for varieties as they are
measured in the trade literature. The model’s income predictions are very insensitive to the
value of ψ; setting ψ = 5 produces virtually identical income differences across countries.
4.2 Model Fit and Income Differences
The model fits the world average Mincerian returns and the within-U.S. variation in school-
ing closely. The model predicts within-U.S. variation in education levels of 1.82, almost
exactly equal to the data; it predicts world average Mincerian returns to education of 9.13%,
in line with the data moment of 9.1%. Figure 3a shows that the predicted Mincerian returns
are nearly constant across countries. The lack of trend in the model fits well with the data,
although the model is unable to explain any of the observed variation. The elasticity of
substitution between high school and college graduates in the U.S. is 1.41, nearly identical
to the Katz and Murphy value.
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Figure 3: Calibrated Model vs. Data
Figure 3b plots the model’s predicted schooling level and the actual schooling level on
the left axis. The model hits the general upward trend in schooling, but it has some difficulty
in matching the exact levels. Figure 3b also plots the average education quality for each
observation on the right axis. The predicted level of schooling tracks quality closely, so the
inability of the model to fit the schooling data better is directly due to measured quality. In
particular, the model has difficulty with the fact that measured quality shows little variation
across the first three income quintiles while average years of schooling doubles.
19
Table 3: Income Differences Due to Schooling
U.S.-Poorest Top-Bottom Quintiles
Data 33 18.2
Baseline Model 4.99 2.67
Comparison Paper HJ99a EKR07b
Result 2.5 4
a Hall and Jones (1999), Table 1.
b Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2007), Table 4. Their
calculations are for two economies assumed to have an income
ratio of 20, which corresponds well to the actual difference
between the top and bottom quintiles.
Now that the model quantitatively replicates the returns to schooling and schooling
attainment data, I back out the implied income differences. Table 3 gives two different
possible ways of breaking down income differences. The model suggests that schooling
accounts for a factor of 2.67 of the observed income differences between the top 20% and the
bottom 20% of countries. The effect here is smaller than predicted in the most comparable
paper from the endogenous school quality literature (Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia
2007).9 I also compare the implied income difference between the United States and the
poorest country. To do so, I solve for the equilibrium in each country by inputting the
country’s actual (Tj, Qj) into the calibrated model. I perform this exercise for each of the
105 countries with the data available, excluding those with fewer than 50 observations for
the estimation of Qj and those with negative estimated Qj. The United States is predicted
to have income 5 times the poorest country; Bosnia, Bolivia, and Laos are in a tight
cluster at the bottom of the distribution, because of their low measured education quality.
The effect is twice what was found in the literature that focuses on years of schooling,
particularly Hall and Jones (1999).
9The effect is much smaller than in Manuelli and Seshadri (2005), who find that human capital accounts
for almost all of the observed income differences. However, their model accommodates a broader definition
of human capital. Bils and Klenow (2000) consider a wide range of human capital production functions
with very different roles for human capital, so direct comparison is not possible.
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5 Collapsing Heterogeneity for Aggregate Outcomes
The cross-sectional heterogeneity in the model is important for interpreting cross-section
wage evidence in the form of Mincerian returns. Cross-sectional heterogeneity plays no
substantive role in generating cross-country income predictions. To see this, consider the
limiting case where γ¯ −→ 1, γ
¯
−→ 1. Then relative schooling, human capital, and output per
capita can be approximated as follows:
Si
Sj
≈
(
Qi
Qj
)η/(1−η)
(15)
Hi
Hj
≈ exp
(
M
η
(Si − Sj)
)
(16)
Yi
Yj
≈ exp
(
M
η
(Si − Sj)
)
Tj
Tj − Sj
Ti − Si
Ti
(17)
As mentioned in the introduction, a common empirical strategy for estimating human
capital stocks due to Bils and Klenow (2000) is to value each year by the average Mincerian
returns to that year. Hence, if M were constant, one would measure log(H) = MS. Equa-
tions 16 and 17 yield an important insight about how to account for education quality in
this procedure. Since years of schooling themselves reflect education quality, they contain
all the information needed to account for differences in education quality. Given η, ac-
counting for education quality consists of taking 1/η to be the markup that represents the
additional education quality difference implied by the years of schooling difference. Since
η < 1, accounting for education quality in this way has the effect of increasing the implied
differences in human capital stocks across countries.
In the previous section η was calibrated to fit aggregate schooling data. However,
equations (15) and (17) suggest an alternative strategy to estimate η and the importance
of quality-adjusted schooling. In particular, use two steps: first, use data on schooling and
education quality to estimate η from equation (15); then treat η as a known and back out
income differences from equation (17). This approach has the virtue of showing that neither
the calibration methodology nor the cross-sectional heterogeneity are driving the model’s
income predictions.
I regress equation (15) in logs, studying every country relative to a constant benchmark
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j. In this case, the regression has the form:
log(Si) = b1 + b2 log(Qi) (18)
where η = b2
1+b2
. Si is the average years of schooling in the foreign country, taken from
Barro and Lee data, while Qi is the returns to schooling of immigrants constructed from
the Census data. Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of b2 for the 86 countries for which
both variables are available.10 The regression suggests an estimate of η = 0.189, much
lower than the calibrated value. Such a low value of η would imply a very large income
importance of education.
Table 4: Estimation of η
Method Dep. Variable b1 b2 R
2 N. Obs
OLS log(Si) 2.456 0.233 0.114 86
(0.226) (0.071)
IV log(Si) 4.738 0.944 0.119 70
(0.945) (0.312)
Expressing this exercise as a regression shows one likely problem, namely that the
education quality measures on the right-hand side are imperfect. At a minimum they
certainly suffer from measurement error (unless Tanzania does possess the world’s highest
quality education, and a few countries have schooling that lowers human capital), and
quite likely they suffer from some bias due to immigrant selection. To correct for this,
I re-run the regressions using log test scores as an instrument for the log of returns to
schooling for immigrants. Table 4 presents the results of this regression. As expected with
measurement error, the instrumental variable estimate is much higher. The estimate of
b2 implies η = 0.486, very close to the value from the calibrated model. The first-stage
regression results are also of some interest, since they lend an economically significant
scale to test scores. A one standard deviation increase in test scores leads to a 2.05-2.38
percentage point increase in human capital generated per year of schooling, evaluated at
the mean. A given year of schooling in the highest education quality country (Singapore)
yields as much human capital as 3.4 years of schooling in the lowest education quality
10All countries with fewer than 50 responses were excluded. South Africa was also excluded as an extreme
outlier in all regressions.
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country (Iran). Using other test scores as instruments produces lower but similar results.11
These results may underestimate cross-country differences in education quality since many
developing countries do not participate in the tests, meaning they are excluded from this
exercise.
Taking η = 0.486 as the true value, I can then use equation (17) to estimate the income
differences due to quality-adjusted schooling predicted by the model for the 96 countries
with data on life expectancy and average schooling attainment (not just the countries used
in the estimation of η). Here, the model predicts that the United States will be 6.45
times richer than the poorest country. It predicts a factor of 3.55 difference between the
top and bottom quintiles of countries. Some care must be taken here and throughout
when comparing across models, since analysis is always conditioned on countries for which
data are available. However, the general results here are modestly higher than in the
previous section. In the next section I augment the model to allow for ex-ante heterogeneity
in education quality across workers in a country. The model then suggests a structural
correction, which I view as a second way to address the concern of immigrant selection.
6 A Model with Heterogeneous Workers and Immi-
grant Selection
The baseline model assumes that all workers in a country are ex-ante identical, with school-
ing differences arising ex-post only because workers choose to be employed in different
industries. Here, I introduce ex-ante worker heterogeneity into the model. Worker hetero-
geneity introduces two complications. First, Mincerian returns are not the private returns
to schooling. Second, immigrants may have different unobservables than non-migrants.
6.1 Changes to the Model
I incorporate worker heterogeneity into the model through the human capital production
function. A worker in dynasty d with Sj(d, t) years of schooling now has human capital
11The Hanushek-Kimko results are preferred since many more countries are included, 70 against 40 for
TIMSS or 37 for PISA, but they are also the most conservative. Using TIMSS test scores as an instrument
yields an estimated η = 0.461. The fitted values suggest that a 1 year of Taiwanese schooling is worth 6.2
years of Ghanaian schooling. Using the PISA test scores yields an estimated η = 0.365. The fitted values
suggest that 1 year of Finnish schooling is worth 4.7 of Peruvian schooling.
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given by a dynasty-specific human capital production function:
Hj(d, t) = exp
[
(Sj(d, t)Qj(d))
η
η
]
(19)
The rate of human capital formation per year of schooling is idiosyncratic to the dynasty. I
will call the term Qj(d) the heterogeneous school quality of the dynasty, although concep-
tually it could also be thought of as ability heterogeneity. Although there are other ways
to introduce heterogeneity in the model, this is the most interesting since school quality
heterogeneity jointly affects the schooling decisions and wages of workers. It is convenient
to disaggregate the dynasty quality into Qj(d) = Q¯j(1 + Q˜j(d)), where Q¯j is the average
school quality in country j, and Q˜j(d) is the dynasty’s mean zero, nonnegative idiosyncratic
component.
The model has the same basic structure in terms of demographics, preferences, and in-
dustries. One change in notation is in order; since workers have different levels of education
quality, different wages can be offered to two workers with the same schooling attainment.
Hence, it is necessary to write the generalized wage schedule Wj(Sj, Qj, t). Similarly, the
wage schedules posted by firms have the form Wj(Sj, Qj, γj, t). The workers’ problem is
still to maximize lifetime income:
max
γj(d,t),Sj(d,t)
∫ τ+Tj
τ+Sj(d,t)
e−
R t
τ Rj(θ)dθWj(Sj(d, t), Qj(d), γj(d, t), t)dt (20)
The worker’s income maximization problem has the same first-order condition:∫ τ+Tj
τ+Sj(d,t)
e−
R t
τ Rj(θ)dθ
∂Wj(Sj(d, t), Qj(d), γ(d, t), t)
∂Sj(d, t)
dt =
e−
R τ+Sj(d,t)
τ Rj(θ)dθWj(Sj(d, t), Qj(d), γj(d, t), Sj(d, t) + τ) (21)
6.2 Balanced Growth Path Adjustments
The balanced growth path of this model looks somewhat different from the model with
identical workers. Again, for exposition I make the assumptions that σ = 1 and that
Tj − Sj is large. Workers still go to school until the private returns equal their internal
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discount rate:
∂ log(Wj(S,Q, γ))
∂S
= R− g = ρ
The optimal schooling level for each worker is:
Sj(γ) =
[
γj(d) (Qj(d))
η
ρ
]1/(1−η)
(22)
The heterogeneous quality of workers is the underlying driving force in explaining the
cross-section of wages and schooling levels. Mincerian returns are no longer the private
returns to schooling. Instead, a worker with higher observed schooling earns higher wages
both because he has more schooling, and because he has a higher education quality and
more human capital per year of schooling. Under the assumed human capital function,
Mincerian returns can be related to the private returns to schooling:
Mj = ρ
(
1 +
1− η
η + εγ(d),Q(d)
)
Since ρ is the private return to schooling in this case, Mincerian returns are biased upward
by quality heterogeneity. The size of the bias depends on the elasticity of industry of
employment with respect to dynasty education quality, εγ(d),Q(d), which is an equilibrium
object in the model. Two special cases illustrate the bias in observed returns. If there
is no quality heterogeneity, then in the limit εγ(d),Q(d) = ∞. In this case all the observed
schooling heterogeneity is driven by industry heterogeneity, and the observed returns are
an unbiased estimate of private returns, Mj = ρ, as in the previous model. If there is
no industry heterogeneity, then in the limit εγ(d),Q(d) = 0. In this case all the observed
schooling heterogeneity is driven by quality heterogeneity, and the observed returns are
biased upward by a constant proportion of private returns, η−1. The calibrated equilibrium
falls in between these two extremes, with an intermediate bias in Mincerian returns.
The returns to schooling of immigrants can be evaluated as in Section 2:
M ij =
Qi(d)
Qj(d)
Mj =
(
Q¯i
Q¯j
)(
1 + Q˜i(d)
1 + Q˜j(d)
)
Mj |Hj(d)=Hi(d) (23)
The average returns to schooling of immigrants are equal to the education quality of im-
migrants relative to the education quality of Americans with the same human capital. For
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example, the average Portuguese immigrant in the United States has 7 years of schooling.
Then the returns to schooling measure the education quality of a Portuguese worker with
7 years of schooling relative to the education quality of an American worker with the same
human capital. In the next section I use the structure of the model to decompose observed
returns into differences in average education quality and selection effects.
7 Calibration and Selection
7.1 Immigrant Selection
U.S. immigration policy explicitly selects based on skills, including schooling. In this model,
it is high education quality immigrants who go to school longer. Selecting on schooling
is then equivalent to selecting on education quality. To measure the degree of selection, I
compare the average years of foreign schooling of immigrants and non-migrants from a given
country. Data on average years of schooling is available from Barro and Lee (2001) for 78
of 130 countries in the sample in Section 3. For every country except Mexico, immigrants
have more schooling than non-migrants. The most extreme case is Sierra Leone, where
immigrants have 13.2 years of schooling and non-migrants have 1.65 years, but the average
amount of selection by this criteria is six years. I take these differences as evidence of large
selection effects.12
For a given set of parameters, the calibrated model provides an exact relationship
Sj(Qj(d)). By inverting this relationship, it is possible to use the educational gap be-
tween migrants and non-migrants to measure the education quality gap between migrants
and non-migrants. With this information I can correct for the bias in measured returns to
schooling of immigrants. In the next section, I consider this structural approach to dealing
with immigrant selection.
7.2 Calibration
Calibration of the model with ex-ante heterogeneity differs in three respects from the cal-
ibration done in Section 4. The first and most fundamental change is that there are now
12There is also a slight discontinuity since the Section 3 data measures average schooling among workers,
while the Barro-Lee data is average schooling in the population over 25. Hence, the average American in
my sample has 13.5 years of schooling, while Barro-Lee report an American average of 12.2, indicating that
Americans are “selected” by 1.3 years. Still, only Mexican immigrants are less selected.
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two possible sources of cross-sectional variation in schooling outcomes within a country: γ
and (1 + Q˜j(d)). In general the model can accommodate arbitrary distributions for these
variables, which leads to a complex matching problem. To simplify, I assume that the
distributions are such that the matching function is one-to-one everywhere. This matching
function implicitly defines a decomposition of observed schooling variation into the relative
proportions from industry and education heterogeneity.
The second change is that observed Mincerian returns now overstate the true returns
to schooling. There is a large labor literature that uses instrumental variable techniques to
attempt to identify the true private returns to schooling; see Card (1999) for an overview.
The basic finding in this literature is that IV estimates of the private returns to schooling
are quantitatively similar to OLS estimates, suggesting that the private returns to schooling
are close to OLS levels. I continue to calibrate the model to target the private returns to
schooling of 9.1%, so that the measured Mincerian returns to schooling would be higher.
This methodology has the virtue of isolating the effect of accounting for immigrant selection.
Finally, the returns to schooling of immigrants to the United States are no longer a valid
measure of their source country education quality, because immigrants may be selected.
Hence, it is no longer appropriate to treat M ij as a direct observation on Q¯i. Instead, I add
Q¯i to the set of parameters to be calibrated, and M
i
j to the set of moments to be matched.
For each country j I simulate the (γj, Q˜j) pair of an immigrant whose schooling attainment
corresponds to the average schooling attainment of immigrants from country j, and of an
American worker who has the same human capital as the immigrant. I then calculate the
implied returns to schooling for country j’s immigrants using equation (23), and compare
that moment to the data.
The result is that the calibration involves the same nine parameters as before (η, γ
¯
, γ¯, α, ρ,
g, δ, σ, and ψ), plus J additional parameters,
{
Q¯j
}J
j=1
. I use the same restrictions and mo-
ments as before, plus the additional moments
{
M jUS
}J
j=1
. I construct a new data set of
the 79 countries for which I also have the average schooling attainment of non-migrants
from the Barro-Lee data. I aggregate the values into quintiles as before, but I also separate
out the United States since American workers serve as an important denominator in the
calibration process. I weight all moments in the calibration by the number of countries in
the corresponding group. Table 5 gives the moments for the five quintiles, plus the United
States for reference.
Overall, the data on life expectancy, income per capita, and Mincerian returns at home
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Table 5: Representative Quintiles
Quintile
Observation 1 2 3 4 5 U.S.
M jUS 4.44% 4.07% 4.42% 6.92% 10.3% 10.3%
Mj 9.14% 10.5% 10.8% 8.16% 7.50% 10.0%
Life Exp. 61.8 72.9 73.9 75.7 79.6 77.9
PPP GDP p.c. 1,904 4,258 7,618 18,386 29,122 36,465
Schooling 3.03 5.34 6.25 8.05 9.65 12.2
Immigrant Schooling 12.8 11.5 11.8 12.3 14.2 13.5
a M jUS and Mj are the log-wage returns to schooling of immigrants to the U.S. and
non-migrants. Life expectancy is age 5 life expectancy calculated as explained in
the text; the value used for Tj is different, as reported. Schooling is average years
schooling from Barro-Lee. Immigrant schooling is average schooling among
immigrants to the United States who are in the sample in Section 3.
and abroad are similar for this group and the sample used for the previous calibration.
Education levels are slightly higher in this group than before. The more striking fact
is revealed in the last row. Despite large changes in average schooling attainment of non-
migrants across income quintiles, there is no strong pattern in average schooling attainment
of immigrants across income quintiles. This fact gives an estimate of the quantitative
magnitude of the selection correction that needs to take place. Table 6 presents most of
the re-calibrated parameters; those chosen based on outside evidence are the same as in
the previous calibration and are not presented. The calibration results are presented in the
next section.
Table 6: Alternative Model Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Role Value
Calibrated to Fit Data
ρ Time Discount Rate 0.065
η εH,S 0.39
γ
¯
Least Skill-Intensive Match 0.86
γ¯ Most Skill-Intensive Match 1.14
ψ Substitution Across Varieties 0.036
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7.3 Results
The model does a reasonable job on several of the moments. It predicts a lower world
Mincerian returns of 8.3%, against 9.22% in the data. It predicts within-U.S. variation in
schooling of 1.86, against 1.82 in the data. The elasticity of substitution between college
and high school workers is predicted to be 1.48, against 1.4 in the data. Figure 4a plots the
model predicted and actual schooling values for the five quintiles, while Figure 4b plots the
predicted and actual returns to schooling for immigrants. The model fits these moments
reasonably well, but there is a tension between fitting both. Take Quintile 3: a higher
education quality would improve the fit with the average schooling data, but would imply
higher returns to schooling for emigrants, worsening the fit along the second dimension.
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Figure 4: Calibrated Model with Heterogeneity vs. Data
Correcting for immigrant selection makes a large difference in the quality measures
used in the calibration. Based on differences in years of schooling between migrants and
non-migrants, it seems that immigrants from developing countries are more selected than
those from developed countries. Figure 5 confirms this intuition. For each quintile, it de-
composes returns to schooling (relative to U.S.) into two portions: that due to average
school quality (relative to U.S. average school quality) and that due to selection. Selection
accounts for a higher portion of the observed returns to schooling of first income quintile
countries, whether measured in absolute or relative terms. The model predicts that all im-
migrants are positively selected. However, immigrants from developing countries are more
selected, suggesting again that accounting for selection will increase the implied importance
of quality-adjusted schooling. The implied education quality differences across countries are
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large: a given year of schooling in the richest income quintile yields the same human capital
as five years of schooling in the poorest income quintile.
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Figure 5: Decomposed Education Quality and Selection Effects
The structural correction makes predictions about the relative importance of quality-
adjusted schooling that are similar to those from the reduced form correction. The model
accounts for a factor of 3.43 of the income difference between the top and bottom quintiles.
I also compare the United States to the poorest country. Again, I feed in the data (Tj, Qj)
for each of the 105 countries for which it is available; I also feed in the immigrant selection
measure of the appropriate income quintile. The model predicts that schooling accounts
for nearly a factor of 8 income difference between the United States and the poorest coun-
try. Results for the benchmark model and both corrections for immigrant selection are
summarized in Table 7. Two different methods of controlling for immigrant selection both
suggest that if anything, the returns to schooling of immigrants underestimate education
quality and human capital differences across countries. Hence, controlling for immigrant
selection leads to a larger role for quality-adjusted schooling. The results are now about 3
times larger than in the accounting exercises using only years of schooling, and only slightly
smaller than in the most comparable paper in the endogenous school quality literature.
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Table 7: Income Differences Due to Schooling
U.S.-Poorest Top-Bottom Quintiles
Data 33 18.2
Baseline Model 4.99 2.67
Reduced-Form Correction 6.45 3.55
Structural Correction 7.91 3.43
Comparison Paper HJ99a EKR06b
Result 2.5 4
a Hall and Jones (1999), Table 1.
b Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2007), Table 4. Their calculations are
for two economies assumed to have an income ratio of 20, which
corresponds well to the actual difference between the top and bottom
quintiles.
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of labor markets where education quality varies exogenously
across countries. Education quality differences are treated as exogenous to students and
measured using the returns to schooling of immigrants to the United States. The implied
education quality differences are large. After controlling for noise, a given year of schooling
in the highest education-quality countries is estimated to yield the same human capital as
3.4-6.7 years of schooling in the lowest education-quality countries. Differences in education
quality may be the cause of cross-country schooling differences, since high returns offer stu-
dents incentives to stay in school. The consequences of joint differences in years of schooling
and education quality are large. The model suggests that quality-adjusted schooling ac-
counts for a factor of 5 of the income difference between the richest and poorest countries;
controlling for selection makes this number larger. Overall, the accounting importance of
quality-adjusted schooling is 2-3 times larger than the number suggested in Hall and Jones
for years of schooling alone.
By design, this paper has little to say about the source of these evidently important
education quality differences. Rather, it is hoped that these estimates will be useful outside
evidence for future research.
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A Model Details
A.1 Final Goods Producer
I assume a zero-profit final-goods producer who purchases Xj(γ, t) of each of the interme-
diate goods and aggregates them into the final good, which she sells to the consumers. The
producer uses a CES aggregator with elasticity ψ:
Yj(t) =
[∫ γ¯
γ
¯
(Xj(γ, t))
1−1/ψdγ
]ψ/(ψ−1)
(24)
I express all time t intermediate good and factor prices in terms of the time t final goods
price so that the prices of intermediate goods, capital, and labor are all real. Then the final
goods producer’s problem is:
max
[∫ γ¯
γ
¯
(Xj(γ, t))
1−1/ψdγ
]ψ/(ψ−1)
−
∫ γ¯
γ
¯
Pj(γ, t)Xj(γ, t)dγ (25)
This problem leads to the standard demand equation:
Xj(γ, t) = Yj(t)
(
1
Pj(γ, t)
)ψ
(26)
A.2 Market Clearing Conditions
There are market clearing conditions in this model for the final goods market, the capi-
tal market, the intermediate goods market for each good, and the labor market for each
schooling level. These conditions are:
Yj(t) =
∫ 1
0
[cj(d, t) + a˙j(d, t) + δaj(d, t)] dd ∀j, t (27)
Kj(t) =
∫ γ¯
γ
¯
Kj(γ, t)dγ =
∫ 1
0
a(d, t)dd ∀t (28)
Xj(γ, t) = Yj(γ, t) ∀j, t, γ (29)
Lj(γ, t) =
∫ 1
0
I (Sj(d) = Sj(γ))
Tj − Sj(d)
Tj
dd ∀j, t, γ (30)
Here, Kj(t) is the aggregate capital stock, which is equal to the sum of all the asset
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savings of the workers in the standard way. I(Sj(d) = Sj(γ)) is an indicator function. Then
the first three market clearing conditions are entirely standard. The fourth requires that
in equilibrium, the employment of industry γ equals the fraction of workers who have the
appropriate level of schooling, I(Sj(d) = Sj(γ)), times the labor supply of those workers,
Tj−Sj(γ,t)
Tj
.
A.3 Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of prices (Rj(t),Wj(S, t), Pj(γ, t))t∈[0,∞) and allocations for inter-
mediate industries
(Kj(γ, t), Lj(γ, t), Yj(γ, t), Sj(γ, t))t∈[0,∞), for the final goods producer (Xj(γ, t), Yj(t)t∈[0,∞),
and for the dynasties (aj(d, t), cj(d, t)Sj(d, t))t∈[0,∞), for each country j. These variables
must satisfy:
1. The intermediate goods producers’ production function, (5) and their FOCs, (6) -
(8).
2. The final goods producer’s CES production function (24) and its FOC, (26).
3. The dynasties’ budget constraints (1), Euler equations (2), and FOCs for schooling,,
(3).
4. The market clearing conditions, (27)-(30).
A balanced growth path is an equilibrium such that the variablesRj, Pj(γ), Lj, Lj(γ), Sj(γ),and
Sj(d) are constant, while Wj,Wj(γ), Kj, Kj(γ), Yj, Yj(γ), Xj(γ), aj(γ, t), and cj(γ) grow at
the same rate g as technology. Crucially, the schooling decision is unaffected by the level
of aggregate TFP so that schooling decisions are stationary.
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B Country Quality Estimates
Table 8: Quality Estimates
Country Obs Returns S.E.
Afghanistan 227 6.42 1.01
Albania 343 -0.95 0.86
Algeria 82 5.88 1.66
Antigua-Barbuda 131 10.96 2.05
Argentina 797 7.62 0.62
Armenia 325 2.82 0.92
Australia 464 11.57 1.06
Austria 153 8.78 1.46
Azerbaijan 115 8.23 1.75
Azores 183 0.42 1.16
Bahamas 108 6.67 2.20
Bangladesh 602 2.76 0.59
Barbados 441 3.99 0.96
Belgium 133 13.89 1.70
Belize/British Honduras 246 4.82 1.16
Bermuda 65 9.17 2.36
Bolivia 371 0.78 0.99
Bosnia 1135 0.70 0.57
Brazil 1572 4.76 0.40
Bulgaria 308 4.74 1.06
Burma (Myanmar) 332 4.95 0.72
Byelorussia 314 5.44 1.22
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 1038 1.31 0.36
Cameroon 61 6.96 3.06
Canada 4137 10.39 0.34
Cape Verde 247 1.99 0.97
Chile 532 6.37 0.77
China 8576 5.34 0.13
Colombia 3667 3.07 0.25
Costa Rica 475 2.03 0.69
Croatia 263 3.32 1.02
Cuba 4842 2.53 0.24
Cyprus 46 0.16 1.88
Czech Republic 109 7.94 2.13
Continued on Next Page
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Table 8: Quality Estimates
Country Obs Returns S.E.
Czechoslovakia 159 5.68 1.55
Denmark 152 6.80 1.65
Dominica 129 2.44 1.76
Dominican Republic 4343 1.52 0.22
Ecuador 2121 1.15 0.33
Egypt/United Arab Rep. 751 6.86 0.77
El Salvador 7502 1.13 0.17
Eritrea 127 1.97 1.22
Ethiopia 493 1.65 0.76
Fiji 311 2.59 0.99
Finland 135 6.36 1.54
France 716 8.15 0.61
Germany 2736 10.44 0.39
Ghana 659 4.22 0.76
Greece 738 4.53 0.59
Grenada 207 3.61 1.46
Guatemala 4497 1.04 0.21
Guyana/British Guiana 1913 5.30 0.41
Haiti 3707 2.87 0.26
Honduras 2532 1.23 0.30
Hong Kong 1177 7.95 0.45
Hungary 302 9.47 1.09
India 6378 6.89 0.21
Indonesia 366 6.75 1.04
Iran 1480 8.39 0.52
Iraq 541 1.82 0.53
Ireland 762 8.84 0.83
Israel/Palestine 589 7.94 0.70
Italy 1625 4.61 0.33
Jamaica 4834 6.14 0.30
Japan 2269 11.44 0.45
Jordan 178 2.54 1.30
Kenya 229 8.33 1.30
Korea 4549 3.31 0.72
Kosovo 70 -1.60 1.78
Kuwait 44 13.90 2.64
Laos 1475 0.75 0.28
Continued on Next Page
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Table 8: Quality Estimates
Country Obs Returns S.E.
Latvia 91 5.09 2.36
Lebanon 468 7.07 0.71
Liberia 315 1.14 1.13
Lithuania 89 7.16 2.46
Macedonia 143 -0.90 1.33
Malaysia 325 7.48 0.78
Mexico 71406 0.85 0.06
Moldavia 164 4.53 1.52
Morocco 264 5.74 0.95
Nepal 81 2.35 1.66
Netherlands 347 12.22 1.06
New Zealand 209 12.45 1.58
Nicaragua 1580 2.34 0.36
Nigeria 913 4.88 0.62
Norway 120 12.08 1.90
Pakistan 1320 5.45 0.41
Panama 560 5.98 0.88
Paraguay 68 3.46 2.09
Peru 2307 3.50 0.38
Philippines 12283 5.80 0.18
Poland 3657 3.05 0.31
Portugal 1531 1.89 0.37
Puerto Rico 4886 4.68 0.22
Republic of Georgia 62 8.88 2.55
Romania 1071 5.50 0.54
Saudi Arabia 42 0.37 2.77
Senegal 74 3.22 1.42
Serbia 81 0.92 1.60
Sierra Leone 188 4.13 1.47
Singapore 104 11.36 1.61
Slovakia 94 8.98 2.56
Somalia 180 0.42 0.82
South Africa (Union of) 506 11.55 0.99
Spain 469 6.42 0.64
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 248 7.53 1.10
St. Kitts-Nevis 98 5.88 2.25
St. Lucia 118 6.00 1.85
Continued on Next Page
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Table 8: Quality Estimates
Country Obs Returns S.E.
St. Vincent 159 6.98 1.28
Sudan 115 2.92 1.44
Sweden 240 14.50 1.41
Switzerland 210 10.43 1.49
Syria 315 3.76 0.82
Taiwan 1618 6.88 0.47
Tanzania 73 15.41 2.52
Thailand 851 3.05 0.46
Tonga 111 -0.80 1.60
Trinidad & Tobago 1567 5.53 0.54
Turkey 437 5.24 0.72
Uganda 100 4.35 1.81
Ukraine 1989 6.73 0.45
United Kingdom 4449 11.45 0.35
United States 4122274 10.25 0.01
Uruguay 188 3.29 1.28
Uzbekistan 150 4.05 1.75
Venezuela 536 5.18 0.70
Vietnam 8276 2.51 0.15
Western Samoa 86 1.85 1.56
Yemen Arab Republic (North) 93 2.13 1.12
Yugoslavia 542 2.66 0.65
Zimbabwe 78 7.84 2.03
Note: Country is the country name as it is recorded in the Census files. Obs is the number
of observations in the 2000 5% PUMS meeting the sample restrictions. Returns are the
log-wage returns to schooling. The returns are measured in percentage points. S.E. is the
standard error of the returns.
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